We examine a simple bargaining setting, where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are repeatedly matched with each other. We begin by c haracterizing e ciency in such a dynamic setting, and discuss how it di ers from e ciency in a centralized static setting. We then study the allocations which can result in equilibrium when the matched buyers and sellers bargain through some extensive game form. We take an implementation approach, characterizing the possible allocation rules which result as the extensive game form is varied. We are particularly concerned with the impact of making trade voluntary: imposing individual rationality on and o the equilibrium path. No buyer or seller consumates an agreement which leaves them worse o than the discounted expected value of their future rematching in the market. Finally, w e compare and contrast the e cient allocations with those that could ever arise as the equlibria of some voluntary negotiation procedure.
Introduction
This paper uses implementation theory to study decentralized contracting in markets that are limited to bilateral bargaining. To this end, we employ a simple model of matching and search with an in nity of buyers and sellers, who wish to trade one indivisible unit of a good. There is a known distribution of seller and buyer valuations. Trade occurs in a nite number of discrete periods. In the rst period, buyers and sellers are randomly matched into pairs and then play a bargaining game that either results in a trade at some price, or no trade. If a buyer-seller match does not result in a trade, then each is randomly rematched with a new potential trading partner in the next period. The cost of search comes from each agent having only a nite number of opportunities to trade and discounting between periods. We characterize the e cient allocations and identify the set of allocations that can be achieved by general bargaining procedures.
Our main departure from past work in this area is that we approach the problem from the implementation theory perspective. On the one hand, consistent with much of the previous literature on decentralized bilateral trade, the matching and search technology described above is taken as given. But contrary to past work on decentralized bilateral trade, we d o not treat the rules of trade as exogenously xed. That is, our objective is not to study properties of equilibira under some speci c game form according to which bilateral trade is governed say, the Rubinstein bargaining game, or the Nash bargaining solution, but rather to pose the implementation question: what allocation rules can be implemented as equilibrium outcomes of some nite extensive form bargaining game of perfect information?
We rst characterize the set of e cient allocation rules in this environment, and then characterize the set of all allocation rules that can be implemented by some bargaining game. Using the conditions for implementability, w e show that there exist robust distributions of buyer and seller valuations in which e cient trading rules cannot be implemented by any bargaining game. Implementation requires that the desired set of allocations coincide exactly with the set of equilibrium outcomes. In fact, we show the stronger statement that e cient trading rules are not even attainable by a n y bargaining game, where attainability only requires that an e cient trading rule correspond to some equilibrium outcome.
The characterization of e cient allocations subject to the matching constraint identi es systematic distortions relative to unconstrained e ciency. The unconstrained rst best is to have a match result in trade if and only if the buyer has a value above the competitive equilibrium price trade and the seller has a value below that price. The transaction price is irrelevant. Subject to matching, however, rst best will generally be unachievable since chance determines which buyers are matched with which sellers. As a result, constrained e ciency can involve trade between buyers and sellers whose values both fall below or above the competitive equilibrium price. We show that the constrained e cient allocations are uniquely determined up to sets of measure zero and characterize such allocations.
We then investigate the implementability of those constrained e cient rules by a general class of nite-length extensive game forms with perfect information. Also, the game form is augmented by appending to each terminal node a signature move for both the buyer and the seller. Both signatures are required, or the mechanism results in no trade for that match. The role of the signatures is to ensure that trade is voluntary, i.e. respects endogenous individual rationality constraints. It is assumed that the the buyer and seller in the match have complete information about each others' valuations, so the solution concept we employ is e ectively backward induction.
In addition to the general characterization, we demonstrate the importance of the implementation approach b y showing an example where e cient trades are not attainable when prices correspond to those from Nash Bargaining; but are attainable when prices correspond to Nash Bargaining with a price cap. Finally, based on some of the necessary conditions from the characterizations, we provide a robust example with heterogeneous seller and buyer valuations where the e cient allocations are not implementable or even attainable, even if there is no discounting.
Relation to the Literature
Because this paper bridges several di erent areas, we discuss separately how it ts in with previous work in three broad themes: competitive bargaining, search, and implementation.
In short, what we are doing here is layering the implementation question on to a standard model of search and competitive bargaining. Thus, our work relates to each of these areas.
Relation to the Competitive Bargaining Literature
The underlying model that we study involves a combination of matching, bargaining, search and rematching over a sequence of trading periods. As such, it is useful for studying pure exchange economies from a non-cooperative, game-theoretic perspective. Past work in the area 1 , has typically assumed both the technological features underlying the matching and search technologies and also has assumed the formal rules according to which bargaining between paired agents is required to follow. It is this latter set of assumptions that marks the rst key di erence between what we are doing and what has been done before. While the 1 By now the collection of papers in this area is too large to summarize exhaustively. The most closely related papers include Gale 1986ab, Wolinsky 1985, Binmore and Herrero 1988 , and McClennan and Sonnenschein 1991 which follow in the footsteps of the early work on search and matching by Butters 1980, Mortensen 1982 , Diamond 1982 and others. The bulk of this work is interested in identifying conditions under which game-theoretic equilibria in these decentralized matching and bilateral bargaining institutions will approximate Walrasian allocations when the frictions seach costs, discount factors, etc. become in nitesimal. We lump all these together under the general heading of competitive bargaining". bargaining rules usually are modeled as a speci c process of o ers and countero ers such a s one based on Rubinstein 1982 and Stahl 1972, we explicitly do not assume a particular game form for the bargaining process. Rather, we are trying to identify the set of allocation rules Walrasian or otherwise that can be achieved as unique Nash equilibrium outcomes of some bargaining mechanism.
The second di erence between this paper and earlier work is that we do not focus on the question of the equivalence between Walrasian and competitive bargaining outcomes when market frictions are small. In fact, our main focus is not the case of frictionless markets per se, but rather on the properties of markets in which frictions exist, despite the large numbers of traders. To this end, we c haracterize e cient allocation rules subject to the matching constraints, and show h o w these di er in systematic and interesting ways from competitive allocations. Our interest then turns to whether these e cient allocations can be attained via any bargaining rules.
Relation to the Search Literature
Sattinger 1995 studies the question of e ciency in a search model with two-sided heterogeneity.
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He nds that the equilibria of matching procedure in which trades take place at prices determined by the Nash bargaining solution can be ine cient e v en taking account of the constraints of the search process. That is, one cannot even attain "second best" e ciency.
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The reason for ine ciency in Sattinger's model is that agents who are faced with a choice of trading in a current match do not account for the e ect that their choice has on the future distribution of valuations in the market, and thus the future value from matching of other agents. 4 There is a problem of congestion and the prices determined by the Nash bargaining solution do not generate adequate incentives for trade to compensate for this externality. In particular, agents do not consumate some trades that society w ould like them to. The innovation of our work is to investigate arbitrary bargaining procedures and ask whether any such procedure can be constructed to provide agents with the correct incentives for trading. To do this, we c haracterize the entire set of pricing and allocation rules that can be implemented by some bargaining procedure and compare this set to the set of constrained e cient allocations. The previous work in this area assumes Nash bargaining to determine transaction prices. We demonstrate that in some environments, this kind of pricing is suboptimal since it creates adverse incentive problems which can easily be avoided 2 Also related are papers by Lu and McA ee 1995 and Peters 1991 who study the allocation rules generated by speci c processes of noncooperative competitive bargaining constrained by matching. Shimer and Smith 1994, 1996 study this matching problem and obtain additional results and characterizations about e cient sorting subject to the constraints of the matching process and the Nash bargaining solution.
This contrasts with earlier work of Mortensen 1982 and Hosios 1990 who showed that e ciency could be acheived, but in models with homogeneous agents.
by resorting to alternative trading mechanisms.
Speci cally, w e provide an example where the e cient trading rule is not attained when prices correspond to Nash bargaining, but can be attained by a simple variation where prices correspond to Nash bargaining with a price cap. Thus, ine ciency under Nash bargaining is not necessarily evidence that e ciency is not attainable. However, we g o o n t o s h o w that there are examples where e ciency is not attainable via any bargaining procedure. Actually, this example identi es a di erent source of ine ciency which is complementary to the congestion problem identi ed in Sattinger 1995 and Shimer and Smith 1994. There agents are too patient and pass up e ciency-enhancing trades. In our example, some agents are overly impatient given their anticipated prospects for trade under any mechanism and so they trade too soon. This reduces the future prospects for other agents below the socially e cient level and creates further impatience.
Relation to the Implementation Literature
Implementation theory formally models trading mechanisms as game forms and tries to obtain general characterizations of the allocation rules that can or cannot be acheived as noncooperative equilibrium outcomes. Although the necessary conditions that come out of this literature must be taken seriously, there is somewhat less consensus about the practicality of many of the su ciency results, where very general and abstract mechanisms are constructed in order to demonstrate that a certain class of allocation rules can be implemented. The canonical mechanisms can been criticized for a variety of reasons relating to their arti ciality, reliance on threats, discontinuities, lack of balance, lack o f w ell de ned behavior on parts of the mechanisms.
5
In this paper, we w ant t o a void the problems of arti ciality a s w ell as the problems inherent i n m e c hanisms for which behavior is not always well-de ned relative to the solution concept. In addition, we wish to begin to remedy two other shortcomings to the existing work in implementation theory.
First, we wish to avoid the use of implausible threats, used either to enforce certain actions in equilibrium, or to prevent certain strategy pro les from being undesirable" equilibria. An extreme example of such a threat which appears often in su ciency constructions is for the planner to destroy all or part of the social endowment, if a particular out-of-equilibrium message pro le is announced. The problem with this is that such outcomes may not actually be carried out, and agents should anticipate this when deciding on strategies. Such mechanisms seem particularly far-fetched in cases where the players have inherent property rights 5 There is a growing literature related to these points and some representative references for various aspects of the problem are: Postlewaite such as an initial endowment or outside option that provide a lower bound on the utility the agent can expect in the mechanism, for all message pro les. In our model, because the buyer and seller in a match will be rematched in the next period, should they fail to agree to exchange, this places a natural individual rationality, o r v oluntary participation, constraint on the process: no buyer or seller will consumate a trade which leaves him or her worse o than the discounted expected value of their future rematching in the market. 6 We call this voluntary implementation.
Voluntary implementation is related to implementation in the face of renegotiation since renegotiation also provides agents with an option outside of what is immediately prescribed by the mechanism. For example, the approach in Maskin and Moore 1988 is to specify an arbitrary, exogenous, and state dependent renegotiation function that converts ine cient outcomes into e cient ones.
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In contrast, our approach does not allow agents to negotiate outside of the explicit rules of the mechanism, so there is no`renegotiation' per se. In particular, we consider nite horizon mechanisms where one or both of the agents may opt for`no trade', e ectively walking away from the current match, after which there is no further interaction between those two agents. Given this available option for no trade which except at the last date leads to rematching, no mechanism can impose an outcome of trade between two matched agents. However, given that agents cannot negotiate outside of a mechanism, it is possible for a mechanism to impose an outcome of no trade between two matched agents even when those two agents have m utual gains from current trade.
As for any process of renegotiation, we use the mechanism to represent whatever the protocol for negotiation between the parties is. Our viewpoint in this paper is thus di erent from the usual implementation`planner imposes a mechanism' viewpoint. Instead our point of view is more positive in that the full interaction between any agents including any renegotiation that they might undertake can be modeled as a game form. Thus, any i n teraction between the agents is a process which can be described in full by a game form, and any distinction between negotiation and renegotiation becomes a question of semantics. Moreover, after this full process has concluded, the outcome is not nal until both agents have signed a piece of paper acknowledging any agreement that they have reached.
Our approach imposes restrictions that i the whole process of interaction can be mod-6 See Ma, Moore and Turnbull 1988 for a look at implementation with an exogenous outside option for each player. In our paper, individual rationality is more involved since voluntary implementation takes the form of an endogenous individual rationality constraint which is determined by the value of future rematching, which in turn depends on the bargaining mechanism itself. 7 Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1992 adopt a di erent approach,`renegotiation-proof implementation,' which requires Pareto e ciency of the continutation outcome at all outcome nodes of the implementing mechanism. A related constraint is`credibility', or the inability to commit to o -equilibrium-path outcomes that the planner as opposed to the players would not wish to impose. See, for example, Chakravorti, Corchon, and Wilkie 1992, Baliga, Corchon, and Sj ostr om 1995 and Baliga and Sj ostr om 1995.
elled as a nite length game, and ii the process itself is not state dependent. Point i is inessential to our results see footnote 29 and used for simpli cation. Point ii represents an important di erence between our approach and that of, say, Maskin and Moore 1988 . The set of available means for negotiation i.e., the mechanism is the language, pieces of paper, and timing, etc., available for interaction between agents. These same means are available regardless of the preferences of two matched agents. What di ers is what agents choose to do as it depends on the state their preferences, match, time, etc.. We think it is essential that the renegotiation process be formally modeled as part of the game form, and be independent of the state although, of course the actions chosen may be state dependent. This is consistent with the seminal discussion on mechanism design by Hurwicz 1972.
We should add that this approach will have some important implications for examples of markets where the option for agents to walk away from a current match is present. For instance, considering the U.S. market for single family homes, there is a standard process of negotiation by which a price is posted, and then o ers and counter o ers are made, lawsuits are brought, escrow accounts are impounded, etc. and these are the same set of available actions that any further negotiation or`renegotiation' also follow, and constitute an overall game form. Any tentative agreement is not binding until the proper signatures are put to paper. The same is true in many security markets e.g. NASDAQ or the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and in fact, most of these exchanges prohibit negotiation between member parties outside of the given rules i.e. mechanisms for trade.
The second issue where we depart from past work in implementation theory is to study dynamic allocation rules. The importance of intertemporal tradeo s is critical since many problems that economists are interested in, such as bargaining, investment, and growth, are dynamic. Unfortunately, implementation theory thus far has had little to contribute to questions of mechanism design in this large arena. Extensive form games have been examined, but only in the context of using them to implement static allocations. 8 Finally, w e emphasize that the notion of implementation we examine here is stronger than simple implementation by subgame perfect equilibrium. Our implementation results are for mechanisms that are constructed as games of perfect information, so our concept of equilibrium is actually backward induction" Herrero and Srivastava 1992.
Summarizing our contributions relative to the implementation literature: using a competitive bargaining model with rematching, we are able to characterize implementability i n a dynamic environment, with an endogenous voluntary participation constraint, and without imposing implausible threats or using mechanisms with arti cial or suspicious features. Thus, we obtain a characterization of what is implementable is this class of dynamic allocation problems, without resorting to the usually cumbersome methods of proof in implementation theory.
Remarks on the Information Structure
In our model, agents know the value of the agent with whom they are currently matched and there is a central authority who enforces the rules of the mechanism independent o f any knowledge the values of the agents. This assumption is common to each of the literatures discussed above, as well as the contract theory literature.
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This approach permits the analysis of mechanism design to focus on incentive problems without introducing the complications of prior beliefs, strategic information transmission, and Bayesian equilibrium. Clearly, most bargaining settings involve some asymmetry of information between negotiating buyers and sellers, and such asymmetric information further compounds the incentive problems and introduces additional potential sources of ine ciency. Our choice is to use a model with symmetric information between bargainers and to focus on a particular source of social ine ciency that arises independent of asymmetric information. From a practical standpoint, in many markets, including some real estate and specialized labor markets, informational asymmetries may play a relatively small role compared to the fundamental problems of value-speci c matching and negotiation on which w e focus.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model and de nitions are presented in Section 3. Constrained e cient allocation rules are characterized in Section 4. Section 5 provides characterizations of voluntary attainability and voluntary implementability. Section 6 combines the results of sections 4 and 5 to study the implementation of constrained e cient allocation rules. Section 7 contains some concluding remarks.
De nitions
The Economy There are two goods. One good is indivisible and the other is divisible. Each seller is endowed with one unit of the indivisible good, and each buyer is endowed with one unit of the divisible numeraire good.
Preferences
Agents' preferences are are characterized by a reservation value of the indivisible good, v 2 0; 1 . There are a nite number of dates, t 2 f 1; : : : ; T g, at which trade can take place, and a common discount parameter 2 0; 1 . A seller with reservation value s who sells her indivisible good for p units of the numeraire good at time t receives net utility t p , s, 
Distributions of Values
Initially, there is a continuum of buyers and of sellers. The distribution of reservation values of the agents remaining in the economy at the beginning of a time t 2 f 1; : : : ; T g is summarized by the following functions.
B t b the mass of buyers at time t with value no more than b. S t s the mass of sellers at time t with value no more than s. These are not cumulative distribution functions, since, for instance, it may be that S t 1 6 = 1. The corresponding distribution functions for S t 1 0 and B t 1 0 are Stv St1 and Btv Bt1 .
The initial mass of buyers and sellers is the same, B 1 1 = S 1 1, so it will always be true that B t 1 = S t 1, for all t. This is without loss of generality, since we can model other cases by adding buyers or sellers who should never trade. 10 We assume that at least one of the two distributions is atomless. Speci cally, w e will assume that the initial distribution of buyers, B 1 , is continuous and increasing at all b 0.
This rules out masses of buyers with identical valuations and assures that there are buyers with values in an any open subinterval of 0,1 . This assumption simpli es the analysis in that we do not have t o w orry about rationing agents with the same valuation, or randomizing.
We also assume that S 1 0 S 1 1, to rule out the trivial case where all matches should be consummated immediately in the rst period.
Pairwise Matching
At the beginning of each period, the remaining buyers and sellers who have not yet traded are pairwise matched with each other. The matching 11 is described by a probability measure There is a measurability problem associated with a law of large numbers over a continuum of i.i.d. random variables see Judd 1985 and Feldman and Gilles 1985. For any nite economy which approximates ours, we could describe a matching process which w ould not be i.i.d. with the above speci ed properties, but there would necessarily be some small dependence in the random variables. Instead, we w ork directly at the limit distributions and simply note that we could come arbitrarily close to nding a matching process that formally justi es the assumed one. See Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame 1992 and Al-Najjar 1996 for more discussion of this.
The distribution over values that any speci c seller with valuation s will be matched with at time t is dBtb Bt1 . Similarly, the distribution over values that any speci c buyer with valuation b will be matched with at time t is dSts St1 . Matched buyers and sellers are fully informed of each other's valuation.
Allocation Rules
Allocation rules describe which buyers and sellers will trade at each time, and what price will be paid i.e., what transfer is made. We restrict our attention to allocation rules which depend only on the time and on the buyers' and sellers' valuations but not their names. This restriction re ects our interest in anonymous processes. An allocation rule consists of a trading rule and a price rule.
Cuto Rules
One type of trading rule that will play an important role in our results is a cuto rule. This is a rule such that the set of buyers who trade with any given seller form an upper interval of the set of buyer types, and the set of sellers who trade with a given buyer form a lower interval of the set of seller types. More formally, A is a cuto rule if for all t and s, In many cases it will not matter whether the inequalities in i are weak or strict see the de nition of equivalence below, and we represent a cuto rule by functions t s corresponding to b 0 in i. 
Evolution of Distributions of Valuations

Equivalence of Trading and Allocation Rules
Given the continuum of agents, we de ne an equivalence over allocation rules that di er only on sets of measure 0. At will coincide with t.
Constrained E ciency
We s a y that a trading rule A is constrained e cient if there exists a price rule p such that A; p maximizes the total expected surplus: Notice that constrained e ciency is a property of trading rules, and thus is independent o f the choice of a price rule p. The constraint" in constrained e ciency is embedded in the de nition of trading rule which respects the matching process. Constrained e ciency is the same as constrained Pareto e ciency if ex-ante transfers of the divisible good can be made among the buyers, and among the sellers. Without such transfers, constrained e ciency as we h a ve de ned it is utilitarian and thus may rule out some constrained Pareto e cient allocations. To see the di erence, consider an example where some sellers are forced to trade with any buyer that they meet in the rst period whose valuation falls below a certain level, even if the buyer's value is less than the seller's. Such trades can be part of a constrained Pareto e cient allocation if no transfers are permitted, since these sellers take l o w v alued buyers out of the market, which leads to higher expected utilities for the other sellers because the remaining pool of buyers has a higher average valuation. This sort of trading fails our de nition of constrained e cient allocation since it does not maximize the overall gains from trade.
Our de nition of e ciency takes the set of agents in the system as given. If one allowed control of the set of agents present, then a perfectly informed planner could induce the extramarginal traders to leave, by mandating that all trade be consummated in the rst period, at the competitive price. We rule out such a s c heme by taking the agents present in the initial matching process as exogenous. Moreover, any o f a n umber of embellishments of the model would nullify schemes of this sort. For example, if there is some aggregate uncertainty about the distribution of buyers or sellers e.g., a nite number of traders sampled from a known distribution, then the competitive price is not known with certainty and every trader could have some probability of being on the right side of the market clearing price.
14 Alternatively as in Shimer and Smith 1994, if there is some match-speci c component of the valuations, so that the value we model is only the expectation of a value which m a y v ary with the match or even just over time, then even traders who have a l o w expected gain from trade may still have a signi cant option value and an incentive to stay in the market. Finally, admitting convex preferences and divisibilities would as in a classical Edgeworth box would o er potential gains from trade to almost all agents even though some could be very small. Rather than complicate the model in one of these ways we simply take the matching process to be exogenous. In the absence of matching considerations or any frictions, Pareto e cient allocations would involve the assets going to the buyers with value at least 1 , m. The competitive allocations is an obvious choice, where sellers sell to the buyers with values above the competitive price, p = 1 , m: In our model, trade is constrained through the matching process, and the characterization of an e cient allocation becomes is complicated since some of the higher value buyers might never be matched to a seller with whom they can trade, and it is sometimes better to clear a trade with a low-valued buyer than to wait for a buyer with a higher expected value.
It is straightforward, but instructive, to derive the constrained e cient allocation rule for this example. In the second last period, all positive v alue trades should be cleared, since there will be no further matching. It is also clear that a constrained e cient trading rule will be a cuto rule, so it su ces to specify the minimum value of a buyer that should trade in the rst period if matched with a 0 value seller. These and other claims in this example are proved in Theorem 1. For any v alue c set as a cuto today, the remaining distribution tomorrow will be B The constrained e cient trading rule is obtained by equating the cuto value equal to the expected value of rematching. That is, on the margin, a trade should be cleared today if and only if it o ers at least as much total value as could be expected by w aiting and clearing the trade tomorrow. Solving for c , the e cient cuto rule is:
The cuto rule is decreasing in m. As the mass of sellers m increases, the current cuto has less of a reduction e ect on tomorrow's expected trading value. Also notice that the cuto value is always lower than the competitive price 1 , m.
The e cient solution in the above example has an easily characterizable form since sellers are e ectively homogeneous, but in many w ays is representative of the characterization which is provided below for the case of general distributions of buyer and seller valuations.
Theorem 1 There exists a unique up to sets of measure 0 c onstrained e cient trading rule. It is a described by cuto rules, with associated functions 1 in the pool in the second period. The right hand side gives the marginal expected value from throwing both players back in the pool to be rematched tomorrow. This marginal expected value has three components. Throwing the players back means that they are matched with two other players who would have been otherwise matched. Given that those two other players will be randomly selected, on average one can treat the opportunity cost for matching them with s and 1 s as being the average trade value in the second period. This is the last expression in 4. The net value that comes from the random rematching of s and 1 s i s then the expected value from each of their rematchings the rst two expressions on the right hand side of 4, less the opportunity cost of the agents with whom they are rematched the last expression on the right hand side of 4. 15 Each trade is in fact of measure 0, so a calculus of variations argument is used in the formal derivation.
Necessary Conditions for Voluntary Implementation and Attainability
Next, we turn to the issue of voluntary implementation and consider the case of arbitrary nite T. Characterizations of voluntary implementation and attainability provide us with the complete collection of allocation rules which could ever be the equilibrium outcomes of such a dynamic interaction -under any negotiation process which is representable by a nite extensive game form of perfect information. With such c haracterizations in hand, we will return to check whether constrained e cient allocations are attainable.
Negotiation and Game Forms
The formal, or informal, negotiation process which g o e s o n b e t ween a buyer and seller who are matched at time t is represented by an extensive game form t . This game form is the same across all pairs matched at time t. The game form t is a nite stage extensive game form of perfect information. The results extend to in nite stage game forms, but nite ones are all that are needed. Since t can depend on time, in equilibrium it can also depend on the measures of agents remaining. However, t cannot depend on the history of play. This is essentially an anonymity restriction so that the mechanism cannot respond to the particular actions of any agent, which is motivated by out interest in modeling markets. If one permits the mechanism to depend fully
The Signature Stage
The heart of our analysis is the assumption that no agreement becomes binding until it is signed by each of the two agents. After negotiations have led to a suggested trade and price, the trade does not take place unless both agents sign" the agreement. This is captured as follows. Consider, t , an extensive game form with perfect recall to be played between an arbitrary buyer and seller at some time t, such that each terminal node suggests either a trade and price, or no trade. Given t , let us de ne a dynamic version, , t , as follows. First, replace any terminal node of t which recommends a trade and price, with a node that has a binary choice node yes, no for the buyer. Let no" lead to a terminal node with no trade as the outcome. Let yes" lead to a binary choice node Yes, No for the seller. Let No" lead to a terminal node with no trade as the outcome, and Yes" lead to a terminal node with the originally prescribed trade and price. We h a ve simply augmented t by additional moves which require both the buyer and seller's signature" before completing the trade.
At a n y time t, each matched buyer and seller play the augmented version of t . If the outcome of , t is trade, then the trade is consumated and the buyer and seller are removed from the matching process. If the outcome is no trade, then the buyer and seller are returned to their respective pools to be rematched in the next period.
As an example, consider a simple dictatorial mechanism t where the seller simply announces a price p 2 0; 1 and the outcome is then trade at price p. ii at any node where an agent's actions may lead either to current trade at some price or to rematching, the agent c hooses an action leading to rematching only if it o ers an expected utility higher than any of the other available actions.
Part i of the de nition of equilibrium imposes sequential rationality in the form of subgame perfect equilibrium. Part ii of the de nition of equilibrium is a tie-breaking rule when an agent is indi erent b e t ween trading today o r w aiting an being rematched. The particular form of the tie-breaking rule is not important: we could have de ned it to have agents always favoring delay i n s u c h situations. One can think of this as being equivalent to a lexicographic preference assumption that eliminates indi erence. 19 This simpli es the analysis, as it produces a unique prediction of an outcome of a given extensive game form as a function of endogenous reservation prices although there can still exist multiple equilibria because of the endogeneity as in Example 2.
Voluntary Attainability and Implementability
An allocation rule A; p i s voluntarily attainable if there exist 1 ; : : : ; T such that at least one equilibrium of the augmented sequence of mechanisms results in an allocation rule that is equivalent t o A; p.
The di erence between attainability and implementability is uniqueness. Attainability does not require uniqueness, and hence is a very weak form of implementation. 20 More generally, one may b e i n terested in knowing all the equilibria of a mechanism, which motivates the de nition below.
An allocation rule A; p i s voluntarily implementable if there exist 1 ; : : : ; T such that each equilibrium of the augmented sequence of mechanisms results in an allocation rule that is equivalent t o A; p.
Alternatively, w e m a y simply be concerned that an e cient trading rule be implemented or attainable and not concerned with the particular prices that are realized. We s a y that a trading rule A is voluntarily implementable if there exists a sequence t such that for each equilibrium there exists a price rule p such that the equilibrium results in an allocation rule equivalent t o A; p. A trading rule A is voluntarily attainable if there exists a sequence t information sets as agents do not know the play of all the other agents in preceeding periods and so it does not have proper subgames so subgame perfection applied overall would simply boil down to Nash equilibrium. The de nition of equilibrium we employ applies subgame perfection directly to each time and match and thus avoids such a problem. 19 We did not model it that way since it would preclude a utility representation. 20 This is roughly equivalent to what has been known in the literature as`truthful' implementation in the case where implementation is possible in direct mechanisms Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin 1979. We d o not consider direct mechanisms given the dynamic and voluntary nature of the problem, so we h a ve de ned attainability.
such that there exists some equilibrium and price rule p such that the equilibrium results in an allocation rule equivalent t o A; p.
Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1992 provide a mechanism for subgame perfect implementation in a pairwise bargaining model, but in their model there is no possibility of rematching. Thus, in their model the agents' reservation values are xed. Given the possibility of rematching we consider here, the reservation values of the agents become endogenous to the equilibrium. This provides serious complications to the implementation problem. We end up having a necessary condition of non-decreasing prices which is similar to Rubinstein and Wolinsky's, except that it is stated relative to the endogenous valuations. Also, we end up with a strong version of an additional individual rationality condition that relates the entire set of prescribed prices thus the prices available through the mechanism to the endogenous reservation values.
First, let us examine the condition which is the appropriate generalization of the Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1992 condition to say that the prices be non-decreasing in the endogenous reservation values. This distinction between valuations and endogenous reservation values is very important since reservation values are not always non-decreasing in an agent's primitive v aluation, as reservation prices depend on future prospects for trade under an allocation rule. Notice that an implication of the above condition is that the price rule can only vary with the reservation prices of the agents.
Non-decreasing Prices
The necessity of non-decreasing prices is veri ed as follows. Since the bargaining game has a nite extensive form with perfect information and agents have strict preferences over outcomes, the equilibrium outcome for every s; b xing reservation prices is unique. Let p = ps; b be the oucome for the pair s; b, and we consider b 0 with a higher reservation value p b 0 subgame must result in this price. This logic is iterated back to the equilibrium path, which implies that changes can only result in a higher price. Increasing the seller's reservation value has similar implications.
In addition to the non-decreasing price condition, an additional condition will be necessary. Given the individual rationality that is at the heart of our Although it is obvious that individual rationality is necessary for voluntary attainability, it is more subtle that a stronger condition is necessary for voluntary attainability. This stronger version of individual rationality, states that there is no price which is traded at by To understand the necessity of this condition suppose that there are agents who should not trade under the desired allocation rule, and there is a mutually individually rational price given their anticipated values from rematching, and this price is available at some terminal node in the tree. Tracing the path from the this terminal node back up the tree, one can nd a best response for each agent at each node and this must leave them at least as well o as trade at this price. In this way one can show that there exists an equilibrium which i n volves trade between these two agents. However, from the uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome for a given pair of agents in their round of bargaining xing their anticipated reservation prices under equilibrium rematchings, they must trade in every equilibrium, which w ould contradict attainability.
We can summarize the conditions which are necessary for voluntary attainability, and thus for voluntary implementability. We make t wo remarks on Theorem 2. First, these conditions are necessary even when one just considers attainability. In other words, these conditions are needed simply to ensure that b A; b p can arise as an equilibrium of any mechanism. The conditions are not arising from multiple equilibrium considerations. Second, these conditions are still necessary for voluntary implementability when one admits in nite stage mechanisms. Details on this are given in a footnote to the proof see appendix.
The conditions of non-decreasing prices and strong individual rationality play a central role in the full characterizations of voluntary attainability and implementation. The full characterization tackles di culties associated with possible discontinuities in the implemented price function, as well as the usual implementation challenge of ruling out equilibria which do not result in an allocation rule equivalent t o A; p. However, in some cases of interest the conditions of non-decreasing prices and strong individual rationality are su cient for voluntary attainability. Let us describe a mechanism that will show this.
Given a set of prices P 0; 1 , denote IRP = fq;r 2 0; 1 2 j 9 p 2 P q p rg: Fix Although the conditions needed for implementation in our setting turn out to be di erent, the mechanism used for implementation or attaining an outcome shares some features with the mechanism in Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1992.
Otherwise, the outcome is no trade.
Consider the case where B 1 and S 1 are continuous and increasing. Let A; p b e a n allocation rule such that A t is a continuous cuto rule, 22 and p t is continuous on A t for all t.
Given these continuity and monotonicity conditions on the allocation rule and the buyer and seller distributions, nondecreasing prices and strong individual rationality are su cient for voluntary attainability. One can easily verify that there is an equilibrium of the above mechanism where the announcement o f p s and p b in equilibrium should be the true endoge- 
A Characterization of Voluntary Implementation
Theorem 3 characterized voluntary attainability for situations where the distributions and allocation rule are well behaved. We n o w consider general distributions and allocation rules, and deal explicitly with the multiple equilibrium problem that is inherent in the endogeneity of reservation prices and thus voluntary implementation.
First, we extend the necessary conditions for the case of general distributions and allocation rules. Let us discuss some of the di erences in the above condition from the conditions stated previously. The conditions V2 V4 are direct extensions of the corresponding previous conditions. The set P t corresponds to the set of prices that are reachable by the implementing mechanism. Sometimes it is necessary for this to be larger than the set of prices which are supposed to be traded at in equilibrium, as o equilibrium behavior will be important i n determining equilibrium behavior see Example 2, below. Then, for instance, the strong individual rationality condition must be satis ed relative to all of the prices in P t . If some price in P t is individually rational, then an equilibrium which results in trade will exist. So V3 must hold relative to all of P t .
Condition V1 is new relative to the non-decreasing prices and strong individual rationality. The function b p t has as domain reservation prices, as these are what matter in determining equilibrium actions. It is necessary then that the implemented price function be measurable with respect to reservation prices, which is condition V1.
The last condition V5 is also added for the general case. It states that the implemented price function can only be increasing in places where we can distinguish the reservation prices of the agent in question. If for instance p s0 p s , but there are no available prices from P t in between p s0 and p s , then these two t ypes would have exactly the same preferences over trades in P t the only ones possible from the implementing mechanism. In such a case, the equilibrium actions of these two t ypes must be the same.
The voluntary trade condition is thus necessary both for voluntary attainability and voluntary implementability. H o wever, voluntary implementability requires an additional necessary condition to avoid multiple equilibria, as illustrated in the following example. But there is another equilibrium relative to the above mechanism! It involves all of the sellers rejecting the rst period price. The second period is as before. This is an equilibrium, since if all the sellers reject in the rst period, then the full mass of buyers is still there in the second period. The average value of the buyers is then 1=2 in the second period. Since this is larger than p 2 , 1 see Example 1, the sellers are indeed acting optimally. Since there are two equilibria, this does not implement the e cient solution 23 . Nonetheless, the e cient allocation rule can be fully implemented by an alternative mechanism which is a simple variation on the above mechanism. Consider the following change: In the rst period the buyer makes a take i t o r l e a ve it o er to the seller from the set of prices p 2, 1; 1 . Any buyer with a value above p 2, 1 w ould rather trade in the rst period, since they expect to have their full value extracted in the second period. High valued buyers can o er sellers enough to get them to trade in the rst period, even if the sellers expect a value above c in the second period. This means that the trades will occur in the rst period that should. Given that they occur, the buyers will be able to o er p 2 , 1 and get it.
The mechanism works because it has a range of available prices in the rst period that is larger than just p 2 , 1. This illustrates the important role of P t in the voluntary trade condition. It also gives us insight to the full characterization of implementation and the relationship to attainability: it must be that A; p is attainable, but other non-equivalent e A; e p's are not attainable. If we set P 1 = p 2 , 1; 1 , then the voluntary trade condition is not satis ed relative to the undesired allocation rule where all of the agents wait until the second period to trade and so that allocation rule will not be an equilibrium outcome. In particular, V3, strong individual rationality, is violated in this example relative to this P t .
For the characterization of implementation, we restrict attention to mechanisms that have the property that there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of the augmented mechanism for each t relative t o e v ery set of reservation prices p s ; p b . W e call these mechanisms closed. This avoids the use of controversial implementation theory tricks" which exploit nonexistence of best responses in some portion of the message space.
Theorem 4 If an allocation rule A; p is voluntarily implementable by a closed m e chanism, then 23 In fact, the e cient equilibrium to the above mechanism is fragile: even a small variation in the expectations makes it better for the sellers to wait. We remark that 1 is necessary for voluntary attainability a s w ell as implementability. This is proven in the appendix.
Condition 1 states the necessity o f v oluntary trade, which w e h a ve discussed earlier. Condition 2 is the condition ruling out undesired multiple equilibria, as illustrated in Example 2. The implementing mechanism used to prove su ciency is a simple variation on the one described in the previous section, prior to Theorem 3.
We know that it is not necessary that P t be closed. It is an open question whether 1 and 2 are su cient in the absence of this condition, or whether there are additional necessary conditions. 6 Attaining or Implementing Constrained E cient Rules Given the characterizations of attainability and implementation, we turn to the issue of attaining or implementing e cient trading rules. Let us begin with an example that illustrates that the consideration of all bargaining procedures is important. There are e cient allocation rules that are not voluntarily attainable when one considers a procedure that results in Nash bargaining solutions, but are voluntarily attainable and implementable via alternative bargaining procedures. This is ine cient, since sellers fail to consummate all e cient trades in the rst period. Thus, if one restricts attention to prices corresponding to Nash bargaining, then the e cient trading rule cannot be voluntarily attained. The source of the adverse incentives under the Nash bargaining price rule is that it splits the buyer and seller surplus in half. As a result, a seller matched with a buyer whose valuation is close to the e cient c would prefer to wait because the trading prospects are more attractive tomorrow. However, the e cient trading rule can be voluntarily attained when one considers a pricing rule that reduces the sellers' prospects tomorrow. A very simple modi cation of the Nash bargaining price rule accomplishes this: place a price ceiling on the transaction, equal to For close to 1 there will exist a ceiling P which creates the right incentives, where sellers matched with a buyer of valuation c will be exactly indi erent b e t ween trading and waiting. To see this, note rst that the right incentives will be provided as long as P is chosen so that P c . This will guarantee that the ceiling is not binding in the rst period and that the cuto value is chosen optimally. It is easy to see that P can be chosen to accomplish this: E 2 p 2 0; b varies continuously in P, ranging from 0 to E 2 b 2 so, for any v alue of c 2 0; 1 , we can choose P so that E 2 p 2 0; b = and so for close to 1 the appropriate value of P will satisfy P c =2, as required. This stationary pricing rule, which is a simple modi cation of Nash bargaining, o ers exactly the right incentives to satisfy strong individual rationality, and together with the e cient trading rule is voluntarily attainable and in fact implementable.
Example 3 shows that the e cient trading rule may not be attainable with a pricing rule determined by Nash bargaining, but could be attainable in conjunction some other natural pricing rule here Nash bargaining with a price cap. This illustrates why it is important t o consider general bargaining procedures and general pricing rules in these matching exchange environments. Consideration of only a single pricing rule, such as Nash bargaining, can signi cantly constrain the set of attainable or implementable allocations.
The Proposition below, however, shows that even admitting general bargaining procedures and pricing rules does not allow one to attain e cient allocation rules in some situations. Generally, there is a rich set of constraints imposed by strong individual rationality, and these can be di cult to satisfy when the distribution of sellers is more general than the one in the examples above.
Proposition 1 There exists a robust set of continuous and increasing distributions of buyer and seller valuations for which the constrained e cient trading rule is not voluntarily attainable and hence not voluntarily implementable.
The robustness mentioned in the Theorem refers to the fact that the result is true for any distributions satisfying the following 24 for small enough 0 1=2. from waiting and thus strictly prefers to trade today, which contradicts the fact that the individual rationality constraint should be binding at 1 0. The robustness follows from the fact that the e cient solution varies continuously with the distribution, so we can work with any distribution satisfying the above conditions for small . The rough intuition is that rst period trades create an externality on the distribution of traders who are rematched in the next period. Thus in the optimal solution, it is possible that some good" trading pairs 25 in the example a low v alued seller and a low-middle valued 24 In fact, the only nontrivial example we know of where the constrained e cient allocation is voluntarily attainable is in the case of homogenous sellers. 25 This is the ip side of examples in Sattinger 1995 and Smith 1994 , where a congestion buyer should not trade and instead be left in the market to o set this externality. This can be true even though the expected surplus from that transaction in the rst period exceeds the sum of the expected surpluses of the two transacting parties were they to search one more period. For any game that tries to implement this e cient solution, some of these trading pairs would prefer to trade in the rst period, which prevents the e cient solution from being an equilibrium outcome.
Concluding Remarks
There are three main contributions in this paper.
First, we provide a characterization of constrained e ciency in a setting with random matching and search. In situations where markets are truly decentralized, standard notions of e ciency are inappropriate since goods may not be transferable arbitrarily from one agent to another. The matching process imposes constraints on the set of feasible allocations, and introduces search externalities across agents. These constraints and externalities are at the heart of the characterization of constrained e ciency.
Second, we provide characterizations of attainability and implementation in situations where mechanisms cannot impose trade on agents. The characterization is intuitive in terms of the strong individual rationality conditions which naturally arise from the voluntary choice of agents either to accept the outcome of the mechanism, or to reject it and search for a new trading partner in the next period. The implementation is shown to be achievable by simple mechanisms using alternating move games with perfect information, with a structure similar to standard bargaining games.
Third, we show that it is often the case that constrained e cient allocations are inconsistent with voluntary decentralized trade under any bargaining game. Even with atomless agents, the externalities cannot be overcome, regardless of the mechanism by which agents negotiate and trade. Thus, in spite of the fact that trading pairs share complete information about each others' valuations, the strong necessary conditions imposed by v oluntary trade are incompatible with overcoming the externalities and achieving e cient allocations.
The strength of the rst two and intuitive c haracterizations we obtain. Relative to the implementation literature, this suggests exploring how the nonimposition restriction behaves in more general environments, especially those where one admits the possibility of some choices in matching, such as those o ered by a centralized exchange. Relative to the competitive bargaining problem, it would be interesting to examine how the analysis extends to an in nite horizon, and to situations where there are in ows of agents.
In our introduction, we discussed our view that any negotiation and renegotiation should be modeled as part of the given game form. This viewpoint strengthens the conclusions of Proposition 1, since the result is true regardless of the form of negotiation that takes place. However, since we h a ve not taken any stand on the particular process that may g o vern such interaction, our admissible class of game forms is still quite large. Although we impose restrictions of perfect information, nite length, signature stages, and lack o f i n teger games, etc., we do not impose a priori restrictions on the speci c structure of negotiation or renegotiation. So, if one considers an environment where there are natural or exogenously determined restrictions on how this process can take place, so that only some of the mechanisms that we have allowed are feasible, then additional conditions could come out of the characterization. We point out, however, that in spite of the larger class of mechanisms we h a ve admitted, our theorems are proven without resorting to complicated or unnatural mechanisms. The implementing mechanisms used to prove the characterization results are extremely simple and involve only a sequential announcement of a reservation price by each agent, and an opportunity for the other agent t o c hallenge this announcement with another price. Thus, in order for any a priori restrictions on negotiation or renegotiation to have an impact, they would have to rule out such mechanisms. Nevertheless, such mechanisms do allow for the imposition of no trade as an outcome even when there are mutual gains from trade to agents. Although this may be reasonable in some markets e.g., security markets, it may not be in others e.g., housing marketswhere it will be necessary to rule out such mechanisms before one can take the su cient conditions for implementation seriously.
Finally, in this model there are no transfers that are made except between the paired agents. Having a centralized authority that could execute transfers across agents and time could help avoid some of the negative externalities and help achieve e ciency. This is an important question for future investigation, and suggest interesting comparisons with with centralized markets. We next present the proofs of theorems 2-4. We do this in the order: Theorem 4, Theorem 2, Theorem 3. This is di erent from the order in the body of the paper, but it is the natural order to present the proofs, since the results in Theorem 4 are used to prove Theorems 2 and 3. The claim in Section 6 and Proposition 1 are proved at the end.
Proof of Theorem 4:
We begin by demonstrating the necessity of the conditions. Suppose that A; p is implemented by 1 ; : : : ; T which satis es the equilibrium existence condition stated prior to Theorem 4. Let P t be the set of prices that correspond to some terminal node of t .
Lemma: For any t, and for any s; b pair, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of , t satisfying ii in the de nition of equilibrium as a function of p s ; p b . I t i s trade at some price if and only if p s ; p b 2 IRP t .
Consider any p s ; p b . By part ii of the de nition of equilibrium, an agent's choice from a set of outcomes is uniquely determined. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes which always exist under the existence condition on the mechanism can thus be found by backward induction, which results in a unique outcome.
Only If: By the veto power that each agent has under the augmented mechanism, the unique equilibrium outcome must be no trade if p s ; p b = 2 IRP t . If: We n o w show that if p s ; p b 2 IRP t , then the unique equilibrium outcome must be trade at some price. Suppose the contrary, so that for some p s ; p b 2 IRP t , the equilibrium outcome is no trade. Consider a pair of equilibrium strategies for p s ; p b when they are matched at time t and denote these . These lead to no trade at time t. Consider also some strategies which lead to the outcome of p at time t and denote these 0 . Alter at each n o d e on the play path of 0 to match the action under 0 at that node, and leave the actions at other nodes under unchanged. Call this new strategy 00 . Since 00 results in trade at p, it must not be an equilibrium for p s and p b . 29 Find the last node along the play path of 00 such that there is an improving deviation for the agent c hoosing at that node. Find a best response for that agent at that node. 30 The new play path must lead to trade at some price since it is improving for that agent and both agents weakly prefer p to no trade. The new strategy combination is now a Nash equilibrium in all subgames from this node on and all subgames o the current play path. Iterate this logic up the nodes of the play path. This results in a subgame perfect equilibrium which has an outcome of trade at some price, which is a contradiction.
With the lemma in hand, we can conclude the proof of necessity in the theorem. V1 and V3 follow directly from the lemma. V2 follows from the lemma and the fact that agents will never accept a price that is not individually rational in an equilibrium of the mechanism.
V4 A sketch of the proof of this case was given in the text for increasing buyer's reservation values. The case of an increase in seller's reservation values is analagous, except the type of improving deviations is to have no-trade replace trade at some price.
31
V5 By V4 we know that p s0 p s Suppose the contrary of V5. Then for all p 2 P t , either p p s and p p s0 , o r p p s and p p s0 . This implies that the set of equilibria is ex- 29 Notice that in nite stage mechanisms can be admitted and this proof still works, since 0 and thus 00 must result in trade after some nite number of stages. 30 We know that there exists a best response at that node, since the other actions at that node yield the same outcomes that they would under , and there is a best response there under . 31 Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1991 Appendix II of the working paper version o er a proof of a similar property.
actly the same for the two agents when either is matched with p b . This implies nonuniqueness of the equilibrium outcome, a contradiction.
Next, let us verify 2.
Consider an A 0 ; p 0 which is not equivalent t o A; p. Consider the b p t and P t de ned for each t as above. Notice that V4 and V5 are satis ed, as they are independent of the allocation rule. We m ust show that one of V1, V2, and V3 fail for A 0 ; p 0 Su ciency is established by constructing a mechanism that will implement a n y A; p satisfying the voluntary trade condition. The mechanism t at time t is the one described in Proof of Claim 1: The set of possible outcomes from the above mechanism is P t . T h us b
follows by the same logic as the lemma, noting that in this case a subgame perfect equilibrium exists because no price is ever approved by both agents. Similarly, i f p s ; p b 2 IRP t then the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is trade at some price, provided an equilibrium exists. We need to show that a subgame perfect equilibrium exists and it is trade at b p t p b ; p s .
Consider the following strategies which result in b p t p b ; p s . It is easily checked that given these expectations, these form a subgame perfect equilibrium. To see that this is an equilibrium, notice rst that if the seller announces a price in excess of his reservation price, the buyer can correct the announcement and win all the surplus, and by V 5 end up paying a lower price. If the seller announces a price below his reservation price, he is directly conceding some surplus to the buyer. If the seller tells the truth, then the buyer cannot claim the seller has a lower reservation price, or this will lead to no trade. Similarly, the buyer cannot gain from understating his reservation price, since the seller could then correct this announcement to the true buyer reservation value, and win all the surplus. After Theorem 4, we claimed that 1 would be necessary even if one only considers attainability, and also if one drops the requirement of a closed mechanism. This is the same as the Under the assumptions of Theorem 3, reservation prices are continuous and non-decreasing functions of s and b. Given the continuity o f p and A it follows that individual rationality must hold with exact equality for cuto pairs. 32 Thus, if b = t s where t is the cuto de ned by the cuto rule A t , then p t b = p t s = p t s; b. To see this, consider a cuto
